Ancestor worship
April 5, 2011
THE GERMAN sociologist Max Weber said the primary reason why China was in such terrible condition at the fag-end of the Qing Dynasty was the pervasive influence of the ancestor-worshipping, arch-conservative Confucius.
It is a simple and compelling theory. Confucianism held the merchant in disdain and promoted the idea of a timeless, harmonious order led by (Confucian) scholars, while the Protestantism that then prevailed in Weber’s northern Europe seemed to encourage enterprise, individuality and industry.
It was compelling, but also complete nonsense, as many writers have since pointed out. If Confucianism was really the problem, then what would explain the entrepreneurial zeal of Hong Kong, Singapore, Taiwan and South Korea? Something else was clearly going on as China disintegrated over the course of the nineteenth century, something involving the geopolitical and technological zeitgeist and the relative advantages enjoyed by a coal-rich and financially nimble island nation like Britain.
People tend to overestimate the importance of ideas, particularly ideas people like Weber. But there is more to it than that. They tend to describe things like empire building, slavery, civil war, religion or tyrannical repression as part of the timeless character of a particular culture, rather than the temporary accidents of history.
These days, they say China has no history of democracy or human rights, and either conclude that a “clash of civilisations” is imminent, or claim that it is misguided and “culturally imperialist” to insist that they hold elections or refrain from locking up dissidents. Islamic countries, they say, are red in tooth and claw, violent and irrational and anti-scientific to their very bones, and it is therefore unrealistic to think that Islam can be reconciled with a largely secularised Christendom, or that it can be secularised too.
All this is, perhaps, another example of Platonic thinking, based on the assumption that there are unchanging national, cultural or religious identities running through us. It is also thoroughly defeatist, and precludes any change at all.
In his pleasant little book, China in the 21st Century, Jeffrey Wasserstrom points out that “some people have now turned Weber upside down and claimed that, while Confucian thinkers may have dismissed merchants as unproductive, the kind of family-centered and generally collectivist and cooperative approach to life fostered by Confucianism is conducive to certain forms of highly profitable business activities.” So instead of ditching the idea of Confucius altogether, they claim that his eternal, archetypal presence is actually responsible for China’s current successes rather than its previous failures, which seems rather too convenient.
The Chinese Communist Party is trying to identify itself as the latest iteration in a long, unbroken line of Chinese “civilisation”, as the trustholders of a spirit that somehow embodies what it means to be Chinese. All their talk about 5,000 years of civilisation seems to me to be intrinsically reactionary. It is something that Lu Xun dismissed a century or so ago, when he asked whether or not his Japanese-style moustache meant that he could no longer be regarded as Chinese.
In any case, with a grand new statue of Confucius now standing outside the refurbished National Museum near Tian’anmen Square, the Chinese Communist Party has already reconciled itself with the old bastard. Confucian “harmony” beats Maoist “revolution” any time, especially if you are trying to cling on to your power and privilege in the face of changes that are both tumultuous and unprecedented.
